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IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response* 
 
James C. Spindler** 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This paper explores how legal liability in the IPO context can 
impact an entrepreneur’s decision of whether and how to take a firm public. 
Liability under the Securities Act of 1933 effectively embeds a put option in an 
IPO security, where the entrepreneur must insure the shareholder against poor 
firm performance, which inflates the price of the security and exposes the 
entrepreneur to risk. This may cause IPO firms to appear to underperform 
relative to non-IPO firms as the option value decays, and may lead the 
entrepreneur to undertake strategic (but destructive) responses to minimize the 
put value and his exposure to risk. Because of the value-destroying 
characteristics of these responses—which include initial underpricing, 
entrenchment, lower NPV projects, asset partitioning, and reduced 
disclosure—this state of affairs is inefficient compared to a system where the 
entrepreneur can simply allocate the risk to shareholders. While the Securities 
Act’s risk-allocation regime may provide some benefits in the form of more 
accurate disclosure, the availability of substitute responses by the 
entrepreneur makes any such benefit uncertain.  
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I.A. Introduction 
 
 When an entrepreneur, who has founded a firm and developed its 
business, decides to take his firm public in an initial public offering (IPO), the 
entrepreneur gets to choose many things about the firm’s initial set-up. For 
instance, he may decide to embed takeover protection in the firm’s charter, 
retain voting control and issue only non-voting stock, or partition the firm’s 
assets and sell only a part thereof to the public shareholders. This choice is 
subject to the shareholder’s valuation of the resulting structure: a 
shareholder will be willing to pay more or less for the firm’s shares depending 
on whether she finds the entrepreneur’s choice agreeable. With this ability to 
bargain, in general we expect to see the selling entrepreneur and purchasing 
shareholders reach efficient outcomes in the structure and form of the firm 
and the firm’s IPO.  
 One such area of bargaining between entrepreneur and shareholder 
involves the assignment of risk. Because the entrepreneur lacks the ability to 
diversify away idiosyncratic risk, while the shareholder can diversify 
completely, the firm is actually worth more in the hands of the shareholder 
than it is in the hands of the entrepreneur. Thus, when the entrepreneur 
sells a share of the firm to the shareholder, one basic area of agreement 
between the two is that the shareholder will bear the risk on the shares that 
she purchases. This is perhaps such an obvious concept as to appear almost 
trivial: we suppose that when a shareholder purchases shares of, say, IBM on 
the open market, the shareholder is fully aware that she bears the risk of a 
decline in the value of those shares. 
 It is the argument of this paper, however, that the U.S. securities laws 
do not allow this simple risk-sharing bargain to be struck in the IPO context,1 
with negative consequences for shareholder and entrepreneur alike. The 
                                                     
1 While “seasoned” issuers—those who are already public companies—are also subject to 
1933 Act liability for the public sale of securities, the rules that apply to them are somewhat 
different, and much more limited in practical application, than to IPO firms. See infra nn. 23, 
60 and accompanying text.  
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reason is that the material misstatement or omission liability standard of 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 effectively grants the shareholder the 
right to “put” back the shares to the entrepreneur for their purchase price in 
the bad state of the world where the firm performs poorly. The shareholder 
relies on information—including the entrepreneur’s expectations about future 
performance—provided by the entrepreneur to make her purchase decision, 
and if, in hindsight, this information appears to have been wrong, the 
shareholder has the legal right to recover her losses from the firm, wiping out 
the entrepreneur’s stake. The entrepreneur ends up bearing idiosyncratic 
risk that could be more efficiently borne by the shareholder. There are two 
principal implications of this risk allocation. 
 First, because the shareholder is purchasing not just the firm’s equity 
but also a put option exercisable in the bad state of the world, the 
shareholder will pay more for the share-cum-option than she would have for 
just the share. This means that the firm initially appears to be valued in 
excess of the net present value of its future cash flows, and, over time, as the 
value of the option component of the security declines, the firm will tend to 
appear to underperform relative to non-IPO firms. This relative 
underperformance is exacerbated when the shareholder exercises her put 
option in the bad state of the world, which will pull assets out of the firm. 
Underperformance of IPOs, which has sometimes been held up as evidence of 
market inefficiency, may in fact be an artifact of regulatory distortion.  
 Second, and more importantly, because this allocation of risk is 
undesirable to the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur may undertake a number 
of strategic responses to attempt to minimize his exposure to the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. These actions could involve initial underpricing of the IPO, 
managerial entrenchment, choosing lower value (but safer) business projects, 
investments in insurance or hedging transactions, partitioning of assets, 
refraining from disclosure of positive information about the firm in the IPO 
prospectus, or firm-level diversification (“empire-building”). Most of these 
 Page 4 
activities have the potential to destroy value, and lead to outcomes that are 
inefficient compared to allowing the entrepreneur and shareholder to allocate 
risk between them as they choose. 
 
B. A Note on This Paper’s Contribution to the Literature 
 
The chief aim of this paper is to describe the effect that securities 
liability has on the incentives of the entrepreneur and the firm from an ex 
ante perspective, providing a linkage between the public capital raising 
process and the nature and structure of the public firms that result. This is 
something on which relatively little has been written. While some have 
argued in very general terms that overly harsh liability or an overly litigious 
environment may keep issuers from the public markets in favor of, inter alia, 
private or offshore deals,2 they do not consider the entrepreneur’s broad 
range of dynamic responses to the threat of litigation. This paper fills that 
gap, and finds that these responses are themselves potentially quite harmful.  
More broadly, this paper bears upon the merits of the Securities Act 
itself, and so weighs in on a question the legal literature has widely 
discussed: whether mandatory disclosure laws are justified.3 While this paper 
does not discuss the potential costs and benefits4 of a private-ordering system 
                                                     
2 See, e.g., Alexander (1991) at 571. 
3 The traditional position argues that securities laws serve to protect investors, who are 
plagued by bounded rationality at the individual or even market level. For modern 
incarnations of this view, see, e.g., Stout (2003); Prentice (2002). In opposition, market-
oriented scholars have argued that a system of private ordering, or at least regulatory 
competition, is preferable to mandatory federal regulation. For instance, Roberta Romano 
argues that securities regulation should be devolved to the states, Paul Mahoney argues that 
securities regulation should be devolved to the exchanges, and Stephen Choi argues that 
securities regulation should be devolved to private parties (though he would require the 
licensing of investors). See Mahoney (1997), Romano (1998), Choi (2000).  
4 A somewhat less developed, though interesting, line of argument, has taken the position 
that mandatory disclosure schemes may have a place even in rational and efficient markets, 
if there are network effects from uniform regulation, or significant externalities from issuer 
disclosure. Easterbrook and Fischel, for instance, discuss the public goods aspect of 
disclosure; were disclosure an opt-in affair, issuing firms would rationally choose to free-ride 
off the disclosure of others. John Coates (2001) takes a somewhat different tack in proposing 
that mandatory disclosure requirements, in their present form, prevent a future political 
backlash against public corporations and securities firms. Allen Ferrell (2004) considers that 
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of disclosure, instead taking the mandatory disclosure regime as given, this 
paper does elaborate upon the costs that a one-size-fits-all system of 
mandatory disclosure and risk-shifting can impose upon issuing firms and 
shareholders. Describing these costs, including the strategic maneuvers by 
the entrepreneur to affect the firm’s structure or capitalization, forms the 
bulk of this paper, to be found in Parts III and IV.  
This paper also considers the issue of how, exactly, current liability 
rules function. This inquiry bears on a major question the literature has 
addressed: whether the litigation mechanism for imposing securities liability 
is “broken.” This literature, which developed around Janet Cooper 
Alexander’s seminal 1991 article,5 argues positively that the underlying 
existence of fraud or material inaccuracy appears uncorrelated with 
settlement outcomes.6 The so-called “strike suit,” where a decline in share 
price, by itself, leads to significant settlement amounts, is ostensibly evidence 
of brokenness.7 I argue, in contrast, that, from a Bayesian point of view, a 
decline in share price should be a major factor in deciding whether inaccurate 
disclosure occurred, and in some cases could be the only factor necessary to 
                                                                                                                                                             
established firms may, in the absence of a mandatory disclosure regime, intentionally 
disclose less in order to raise the cost of capital for potential market-entrant competitors, 
who would be able to free ride off this disclosure.  
5 See Alexander (1991). While the statistical significance of the findings from Alexander’s 
data is questionable, subsequent empirical work has generally backed up her claims. See 
n.__ infra. 
6 See Alexander (1991) at 571 (“costs [of litigation] do not depend upon proof of wrongdoing 
but flow from the simple fact of a sufficiently large decline in share price”). For an example of 
a response to Alexander’s line of inquiry, see Seligman (1994) at 444-5, arguing that price 
drops alone do not lead to suit and settlement. For more recent empirical work on this 
question, see Bohn and Choi (1996), Perino (2003), Choi (2004).  
 In contrast to the two sides of this argument, my argument is that a sufficiently large 
decline in share price is, in fact, “proof of wrongdoing” (to use Alexander’s term), since a 
finder of fact can infer incorrect disclosure from the price adjustment.   
7 For example, Bohn and Choi have used instrumentalities of material misstatements to test 
whether securities actions are meritorious. See Bohn and Choi (1996). Not everyone has 
agreed that the strike-suit phenomenon exists. See, e.g., Seligman (1994). Part of the 
problem has been that data on settlements are hard to come by, since no opinions are filed 
and no judgments entered, and the amounts of settlement are difficult to measure. The new 
current wisdom, however, seems to be that some degree of meritless litigation persists even 
after litigation reforms such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See Perino 
(2003), Choi (2004).  
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support a presumption of inaccuracy. Whatever the merits or demerits of 
Section 11, settlements based on share price declines are consistent with a 
proper, statistically-informed interpretation of Section 11. I explore this point 
in Part II of the paper.  
Along the way, I revisit a puzzle that has caused much ink to be spilt 
in the finance literature: long term underperformance of initial public 
offerings.8 I posit that long term underperformance could, in fact, be an 
artifact of regulation, rather than evidence of dysfunctionality in the capital 
markets; put quite simply, the imposition of Securities Act liability shifts risk 
from shareholders to the entrepreneur, for which the entrepreneur must be 
compensated in the form of an artificially high price for the shares. There has 
been some, though not much, preliminary work along these lines, upon which 
my discussion builds.9 New data makes this issue well worth picking up 
again: studies conducted over the last decade suggest that the magnitude of 
underperformance is not so great as once thought,10 while the incidence of 
securities litigation is significantly higher,11 especially in certain conditions 
and for certain firms, than was previously believed. Part III.D puts forth a 
simple method for measuring the magnitude of this effect, and finds that the 
liability data are consistent with observed underperformance.  
                                                     
8 “Underperformance” is defined as the long term performance measured from the close of 
the first day’s trading. Measuring from the first day’s close is done since the closing price 
should represent the fair market value of the issuing firm based upon all publicly available 
information. See Brealey and Myers, at ___. This phenomenon was first documented by 
Ritter (1991).  
9 Alexander discusses a “litigation put” that acts as insurance against market losses, though 
she dismisses the possibility of significant effects upon price. See Alexander (1994) at 1447 
(considering the “theoretical plausibility” of an embedded put, but concluding that it would 
likely be of “negligible value”). Alexander uses the put, instead, to analyze whether securities 
damages are measured accurately. See Alexander (1991) at 570 (“to the extent that the ... 
termination of the litigation put affects share price, [the current system of measuring 
damages] systematically overstates the amount of damages”). 
 Similarly, Hughes and Thakor (1992) point out that litigation avoidance theories of initial 
underpricing can be theoretically consistent with observed long term underperformance, but 
then leave the matter at that.  
10 See Ritter and Welch (2002).  
11 See Perino (2003); Bohn and Choi (1996).  
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 The paper proceeds as follows: in Part II, I provide a description of IPO 
liability under the Securities Act of 1933, and explain how application of the 
Act’s liability provisions embeds a put option in the firm’s publicly offered 
securities. In Part III, I discuss observed trends in IPO price performance, 
develop a simple model of how the embedded put affects stock price over 
time, and examine existing empirical studies to find that the magnitude of 
the embedded option effect may match up with findings of long-term 
underperformance among IPO firms. In Part IV, I describe how the 
entrepreneur may strategically alter the firm’s capital structure, investment 
activity, or other attributes in order to minimize idiosyncratic risk, and also 
examine the inefficiencies generated by these strategic maneuvers. Part V 
briefly concludes.  
 
II.  Embedding Put-Options through Disclosure Liability 
 
 A. Liability for Inaccurate Disclosure 
 
The standard for liability in a public offering of securities is set by 
Section 11 of the 1933 Act, which provides that an issuing firm (along with, 
subject to a due diligence defense, the underwriter and the issuer’s directors 
and officers) is strictly liable for any material misstatements or omissions in 
a registration statement or prospectus.12 The measure of damages if the 
plaintiff shows a material misstatement or omission is the initial offering 
price of the securities, less the price at the time of suit.13 A misstatement or 
omission is deemed “material” if it is something that a reasonable investor 
                                                     
12 In addition to specifically mandated disclosures, Rule 408 of the Securities Act requires 
issuing firms to disclose in a prospectus “such further material information, if any, as may be 
necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading.”  
13 This is, however, subject to an affirmative defense: if the defendant firm can prove that 
some portion of the decline in price resulted from factors other than the firm’s inaccurate 
disclosure, the firm can escape liability for that portion of the decline. See Securities Act 
Section 11(e). There are alternative forms of damage calculations under Section 11(e) in the 
event that the shareholder has sold prior to suit, or enjoys an appreciation in value post-suit, 
but these do not affect the analysis.  
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would have considered important to her investment decision—in short, if it is 
something investors should care about, it is material.14 Looking at markets as 
a whole, then, any information that affects the price of a security is material, 
since a change in price means that investors are changing their investment 
decisions.15 
Because little, if any, prior information about IPO firms is available, 
investors are dependent upon the firm to provide information about itself.16 
The Securities Act maintains strict control over the flow of information from 
the issuing firm, such that the offering prospectus will contain virtually all of 
the publicly available information about the firm. If the Securities Act 
successfully prohibits other disclosure of information, then the firm’s price 
will be based entirely upon the IPO disclosure.17 Since the price of a security 
                                                     
14 The concept of “materiality” is defined by Rule 405 of the 1933 Act, which states that “the 
term ‘material’ … [refers] to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable investor would attach importance in determining to purchase the security….” See 
also Vizcarrondo and Houston, Liability, 1385 PLI/Corp 1067 at 1076 (“The leading case on 
materiality is TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), which defined a 
material fact as one to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would attach importance in making a decision because the fact would significantly alter the 
"total mix" of available information.”) 
15 This type of standard has been adopted in other securities litigation contexts as well, such 
as 10b-5 claims of fraudulent disclosure that rely on the “fraud on the market” doctrine.” 
Price movements in the market price of a security are adequate to prove reliance under Rule 
10b-5. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d. 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975).  
16 Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it illegal to sell or offer securities prior to the filing of 
a registration statement with the SEC. “Offer” is defined broadly under Section 2 of the 
Securities Act to include virtually any information released by the issuer or its agents with a 
view toward encouraging investors to purchase the issuer’s securities. See SEC Releases 
3844 and 5180. Subsequent to filing of the registration statement, written offers may only be 
made via the prospectus contained in the registrations statement, and oral offers are subject 
to liability under Section 12(a)(2). Thus, the Securities Act effectively channels all 
information about an IPO issuer through the Act’s disclosure apparatus. In rare cases, 
significant information or “buzz” may exist about a pre-IPO firm. Google is an example of 
this, and, indeed, Google appeared to rely largely on its pre-existing reputation to market its 
shares to investors, being rather reluctant to disclose additional information in the IPO 
itself.  
17 Some “leakage” probably does occur, but either the source must be subject to reputational 
penalties or to liability of some sort, in order for leaked information to be credible to the 
market. Other communications, such as roadshows, are allowed at certain times, but these 
communications are also subject to strict liability, under Section 12 of the 1933 Act (subject 
to a reasonable care defense). So-called “free-writings” (written materials that accompany a 
final Section 10(a) prospectus and are subject to fraud liability) are only available post-
effectiveness, subsequent to pricing. There is the possibility that information may leak to the 
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is determined by a firm’s expected returns, as well as the degree of non-
diversifiable risk that accompanies those expected returns,18 the firm’s IPO 
prospectus must convey this information to the investor. So we might 
conceive of the prospectus as describing a range of outcomes and their 
respective probabilities, which translate into a market price.  
Suppose an investor is considering a purchase of a security in an IPO, 
such as the hypothetical eBank.com, an online bank. In order to arrive at a 
valuation for the securities, the investor will need to receive from the firm 
information that allows the investor to construct a probabilistic expectation 
of the company’s future cash flows. This information, which the Securities 
Act requires to be communicated via the prospectus, will be a mixture of all 
sorts of information, hard and soft, such as loan loss provisions, capital 
budgeting, expectations regarding future deposits, expectations regarding 
new lines of business, statements about the company’s competitive position, 
and descriptions of managerial competence and reputation. Forward-looking 
information, such as earnings forecasts, are particularly important.19 
Assuming they believe this information is true, the investor and wider 
market will calculate net present value payoffs of the firm (say, for instance, 
a per share expected payoff of $45), with some degree of risk (such as an 
expected standard deviation in the expected per share payoff of $8), an 
element of which is non-diversifiable. Given the levels of risk and the 
expected payoff, and taking into account the time value of money, the 
investor can arrive at a fair market value for the stock, say, $42. 
                                                                                                                                                             
market via other means that incur a lower level of liability, such as analyst research reports 
or underwriter reputation. See James Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of 
Interest and the Market for Underwriting Business, University of Chicago Olin Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 215 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564381), for a 
model of signaling via analyst research reports. 
18 Investors care only about systemic, non-diversifiable risk, also known as beta. Diversifiable 
risk (also known as idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk) may be “diversified away” by holding 
many different sorts of assets in a portfolio. See Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate 
Finance, 6th Edition, Chapter 7. 
19 See Kim and Ritter, Valuing IPOs, 53 Journal of Financial Economics 409 (1999).  
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Obviously, since our investor is dependent upon the issuing firm for 
information about the firm, there needs to be some mechanism—such as a 
regime of issuer liability—in place to make issuer-originated information 
credible and reliable.20 Section 11 of the Securities Act does just this.21 Any 
material inaccuracy results in liability; no fault in terms of inadequate care 
or deceptive intent is required for the issuer to be held liable, only inaccuracy 
of the prospectus disclosure. This strict accuracy requirement applies 
statements of hard fact (“our revenues were $100MM in fiscal 2004”) and to 
disclosures regarding risk (“our revenues are dependent upon continued good 
relationships with several key clients”), though specific projections and plans, 
such as earnings estimates (“we expect our revenues to be higher in fiscal 
2005”), are not required to be ex post accurate.22 Liability also attaches for 
                                                     
20 In a perfectly well-functioning market and in the absence of regulation, we might suppose 
that market forces would give rise to non-statutory methods of credibility enhancement, such 
as certification by repeat-player auditors and investment banking intermediaries. However, 
for whatever reason (such as transaction or search costs, public goods aspects of disclosure, 
or simple public choice or inertia), in reality we have a system of mandatory disclosure and 
statutory liability. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure 
of Corporate Law at 283. 
21 Section 11 is buttressed by Section 12, which covers oral statements in the waiting period 
(such as roadshow communications), and the anti-fraud provisions of Section 17 and 
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.  
22 Some of these statements may qualify as “forward looking statements” under Rule 175 of 
the 1933 Act, and have a slightly more (though how much more is uncertain) protected 
status. Rule 175 provides that forward looking statements, such as estimated future 
revenues, are not subject to liability except when made or reaffirmed “without a reasonable 
basis” or “other than in good faith.” Forward looking statements and projections are not 
actionable simply because they are wrong ex post; they must also have been “wrong” ex ante 
(i.e., they were unreasonable when made). This protection is limited to rather narrowly 
defined “forward-looking statements,” which comprise principally specific plans and 
projected economic targets. So, supposing an issuing firm discloses a profit estimate, even 
though the firm is not ipso facto liable if it does not meet that estimate, the firm is still 
strictly liable for disclosing risks that might lead the firm to fall short of that estimate. See 
In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation—Taj Mahal Litigation, 7 F.3d. 357 (3rd 
Circuit, 1993), where the court applies the so-called “bespeaks caution” doctrine despite the 
ostensible applicability of the Rule 175 safe harbor. This is qualified further by the strictures 
of the SEC and courts as to what qualifies as “reasonable” and “good faith” disclosure, since 
these terms require a high degree of likelihood of, or confidence in, the projection’s coming 
true. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, Item 10(b); BNA Corporate Practice Series, Regulatory 
Aspects of the Initial Public Offering of Securities, BNACPS No. 60 § VI at n.5 (“Issuers have 
generally not taken advantage of the ‘opportunity’ [of Rule 175 disclosure] presented by the 
SEC due to concerns that "good faith" might imply a belief on the part of the issuer that the 
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material omissions, such as failure to disclose risks or flaws in the firm’s 
business. The firm is also liable for disclosure, or omissions thereof, regarding 
the firm’s exposure to market risk; this makes perfect sense since market 
risk, not firm-specific risk, is what the diversified investor should care 
about.23 
How should a court treat a suit by a shareholder who claims that 
eBank’s disclosures pertaining to future performance were inaccurate? 
Suppose that the investor went ahead and bought the eBank share for $42. A 
year passes, and the actual payoff is revealed to be $29, as opposed to the 
expected value of $45. Just on the facts of the situation so far, it is 
conceivable that the $29 payoff is consistent with the disclosure in the 
prospectus that described an expected value of $45: with a standard deviation 
of $8, we would expect a result like this (or worse) to occur about 2.5% of the 
time. It is a highly unlikely result, though not impossible. However, a 
plaintiff need not show with certainty that the projections were wrong; to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
projections were based on facts that make the achievement of the projections "highly 
probable").  
 In any event, Congress appeared to recognize that even the Rule 175 safe harbor was 
inadequate to encourage adequate disclosure, particularly of positive forward looking 
information. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) further limits 
liability for seasoned (but not IPO) issuers by making forward looking statements subject 
only to a fraud standard of liability. See Securities Act §27A(b)(2)(D), (c). The PSLRA was 
enacted largely “in order to loosen the ‘muzzling effect’ of potential liability for forward-
looking statements, which often kept investors in the dark about what management foresaw 
for the company.” Kevin P. Roddy, Seven Years of Practice and Procedure Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SJ014 ALI-ABA 395 at 475 (citations omitted). 
However, the efficacy of the PSLRA is questionable, too. For both Rule 175 and the PSLRA, 
there is always uncertainty as to what constitutes a “forward-looking statement” in the first 
place. See, e.g., In re Reliance Secs. Litig., 135 F.Supp.2d 480, at *21 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2001) 
(finding that management’s statement of belief in adequacy of loss reserve was not forward 
looking, even though loss reserves relate to expectations of future losses), In re Splash Tech. 
Holdings, Inc. Secs. Litig. 2000 WL 1727377, at *6 (finding statements regarding “planned 
investments” and market segment health not to be forward looking under the safe harbor).  
23 The Securities Act requires issuing firms to make disclosure concerning industry 
conditions and trends, as well as sensitivity to market and credit risk. See Items 303 and 305 
of Regulation S-K, as well as the general material information requirement of Rule 408. In 
practice, firms do provide significant disclosure regarding market risks that have little to do 
with their businesses directly (see, e.g., Form F-1 of HDFC Bank, at __, describing risks of 
war, including nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan). To the extent that firms 
themselves are better able to provide this market-sensitivity information than outsiders, this 
would appear a reasonable approach.  
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contrary, she need only show it is more likely than not that the projections 
were incorrect. And so, here, an actual payoff that is only likely to occur with 
a probability of 2.5% if eBank’s projections were accurate, while not the end 
of the inquiry, can go some way toward showing that management’s 
prospectus disclosure was probably incorrect.  
To take a simpler example of such analysis, suppose that an 
entrepreneur sells to an investor a security based on five flips of a supposedly 
fair coin, which, after five flips, self-destructs. Each time the coin comes up 
heads, the investor gets $1 from the entrepreneur, while each time it comes 
up tails, the investor gets nothing. If the investor believes that the coin is a 
fair coin, the investor should be willing to pay up to $2.50 for this security. 
But suppose that the coin comes up tails five times in a row. With no 
information available other than this, can the investor make a valid claim 
that he has been cheated? Here, the analog of the issuer’s “projection” is the 
entrepreneur’s assurance that the coin is “fair,” i.e., that it pays off $1 on 
each flip with probability of .5. Then, the actual result (a zero payoff) is one 
that should occur only one in thirty-two times with a fair coin.  
The investor might allege that the coin was an unfair coin, and sue 
under Section 11. Absent the opportunity to inspect the coin directly, the 
court would have to look at the degree of prior confidence in the seller’s 
projection that the coin was fair. Suppose, for instance, the entrepreneur had 
tested the coin only twice before selling it, observing one head and one tail, 
and based his price of $2.50 on that. Adding to this sample the five observed 
tails post-sale, and assuming no other information is available, the court 
could infer a likely outcome of about 14% heads, for an ex ante value of $0.71, 
and the entrepreneur would have to pay back $1.79.24  
                                                     
24 We might wonder if the entrepreneur’s estimate of the value could fall under the Rule 175 
safe harbor for forward looking statements. Such a projection may fit the safe harbor’s 
narrow definition; however, it is unlikely that a projection based on two observations would 
count as “reasonable” or in “good faith.” Additionally, the risk that the coin itself might have 
been unfair is not subject to the disclosure safe harbor, and omission of this risk disclosure 
would be grounds for Section 11 liability.  
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However, it is quite likely that prior data of this sort are not available, 
especially in the much more complex real world where information is not so 
readily quantified, and also because the entrepreneur’s prior knowledge 
regarding the firm is not directly verifiable. In the eBank scenario, it seems 
quite unlikely that the court would have such data. In that case, one can 
estimate an ex ante probability regarding the projections’ accuracy, allowing 
us to perform Bayesian analysis to determine the likelihood of accuracy given 
the outcome that occurred.25 In calculating a prior confidence of accuracy, if 
management is known to be very honest and very competent, for example, we 
would assign a higher ex ante probability of accuracy to their projections 
than if they were dishonest and incompetent. Other factors could include 
looking at the projections’ accuracy in predicting various discrete 
contingencies,26 calling to the stand business and finance experts to opine as 
to the reasonableness of such projections at the time made, examining what 
projections similarly situated firms made and how their results varied, the 
care and research that went into the projections, management’s past history 
and reputation, and the accuracy of managerial projections of other firms.27 
This prior confidence is then updated by the actual ex post outcome. So, if we 
believe that, from an ex ante perspective, eBank’s management was 
relatively unlikely to be accurate, and that the poor results obtained were 
likely to occur if eBank’s projections were wrong, then we could find it more 
likely than not that the projections were, in fact, inaccurate: eBank should be 
held liable under Section 11. Furthermore, the poorer the actual result, the 
more likely it is that eBank should have to pay. In this fashion, the court can 
                                                     
25 Bayesian probability states that the probability of A occurring given that B has occurred is 
equal to the probability of A and B occurring together divided by the probability of B 
occurring. See James Joyce, "Bayes' Theorem", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).  
 Hughes and Thakor (1992) develop a similar sort of analysis, where underwriter reputation 
serves as the ex ante prior confidence in the correctness of the offering price.  
26 If we find that management was wrong about nearly everything, we would be led to 
question their general accuracy and predictive ability.  
27 This is essentially Rule 175’s requirement that projections and forward looking statements 
are not actionable if they have a “reasonable basis.” See n. 23, supra.  
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incorporate much by way of qualitative evidence in figuring out whether the 
firm ought to be found liable. 
Another way of looking at the problem is that, given any level of ex 
ante belief in the accuracy of the firm’s disclosure, there is range of bad 
outcomes (the “bad state of the world”) where the issuing firm should be 
found liable under Section 11. This is true for every issuer no matter what 
the ex ante confidence in its projections is (short of absolute certainty): a 
sufficiently bad outcome still results in a correct ex post determination that 
the issuer’s projection was, more likely than not, wrong. As the firm performs 
more and more poorly, the likelihood increases that the firm (and the 
entrepreneur) will be found liable under Section 11 and made to pay. In a 
very real sense, then, eBank and other issuers like it are put into the position 
of insuring shareholders against bad outcomes.  
 
B. Option Characteristics of 1933 Act Liability. 
 
Liability under Section 11 of the 1933 Act bears a striking resemblance 
to a “put” option.28 A put option is a derivative security that allows the holder 
to sell (or “put”) an underlying security, such as an equity share, to the 
counterparty for a set price (also known as the “strike” price). Options usually 
have a built-in date of expiration, and their value tends to decline over time 
(known as “time decay”) as the date of expiration approaches; the reason for 
this is that options are more valuable as uncertainty is greater, and there is, 
of course, more uncertainty over a longer period of time than over a shorter 
one.  
The right of recovery under Section 11 expires with the running of the 
statute of limitations in the 1933 Act. The right of action expires one year 
from the date of discovery of the misstatement or omission, and in no event 
can an action be brought more than three years after the date of the public 
                                                     
28 See Alexander (1991, 1994) for a prior discussion of put characteristics of securities 
liability.  
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offering.29 Subsequent purchasers of the securities sold in the offering may 
bring suit, so long as they can trace their securities back to the public 
offering.30  
Damages under Section 11 are the difference between the initial 
offering price of the security and the price at which the plaintiff brought 
suit.31 A successful plaintiff therefore has the functional equivalent of the 
right to “put” the shares back to the issuer at the public offering price. For 
example, an eBank shareholder, if the share was trading at $29 at the time of 
suit, would recover the $13 difference if her suit proves successful. Since the 
eBank shares are listed and presumably still liquid, she can sell her shares 
and be back exactly where she started, with her $42 investment. In this case, 
the $42 initial purchase price would be the strike price of the put. 
Finally, under Section 11, shareholders can sue any time the price of 
the securities declines below the initial offering price. As described above, 
whether the suit is successful depends on whether the firm’s performance has 
been poor enough to make it appear more likely than not that management’s 
disclosures were materially inaccurate. This means that there is a range of 
price that is below the public offering price but where the shareholder will 
not be able to exercise the put.32 The level of this threshold will depend upon 
ex ante estimations of prior accuracy, and we might expect that both 
                                                     
29 See §13 of the 1933 Act. One should note that the statute of limitations for fraud has been 
increased under §804 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act to two years after the discovery of the fraud, 
and not more than five years after the commission. 
30 This may not always be easy to do, at least for individual subsequent purchases made 
through a broker. See Hillary Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) 
of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 429. While the simplified model of this paper 
only contemplates one primary offering (making tracing irrelevant), in real life the tracing 
requirement could mean that shares lose value as they trade hands, creating illiquidity, and 
that shares are worth more in the hands of some investors, such as large institutional 
investors who have the economy of scale to ensure that tracing requirements are met, than 
others.  
31 The defendant can show that the plaintiff’s damages (i.e., the difference between the offer 
price and the price at the time of suit) were caused by other than the misstatement—but this 
is really getting to an issue of materiality as discussed above.  
32 Because of this, the option payoff would appear kinked, with a payoff of zero between the 
offering price and the price point at which a court would find liability.  
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investors and issuers anticipate, with at least a rough degree of precision, 
that a certain low level of firm and security price performance would allow a 
successful Section 11 suit. So, at the time the equity cum put option is offered 
for sale, purchaser and seller alike are aware that the embedded put option 
will be exercisable in the bad state of the world, and so both the purchaser 
and seller can arrive at a valuation for the option. The total price paid for an 
IPO share will be the fair market value of the equity security, plus the fair 
market value of the embedded put option; the trading price of the firm’s 
securities will imply a valuation that is in excess of the total value of the 
firm.  
How will the price of the option vary? First, we know that options 
decline in value as they approach their expiration date. This is due to the 
decline in uncertainty that the option is insuring against: as the expiration 
date approaches, the insurance policy covers a smaller span of time, which 
means that it is worth less. After their expiration date, options are worth 
nothing: they have either been exercised, or they are expired. So, even 
assuming the underlying value of the equity stays constant (i.e., market 
expectations regarding the firm do not change or the firm performs exactly to 
expectations), we should see a declining share price over time (relative to 
what it would have been without the put option) dating from the end of 
trading on the day of the IPO to the running of the statute of limitations. 
Even IPO firms that perform up to expectations (and even, to some extent, 
beyond expectations) should experience price underperformance relative to 
identical non-IPO firms.  
Second, the value of the put option will depend upon the financial 
condition and structure of the firm. For an insolvent firm that cannot possibly 
make good on the shareholders’ put option, the option will be worth nothing, 
and it will be as though Section 11 liability does not exist. Shareholders will 
bear the risk of poor future performance, but, at the same time, they will not 
have paid for insurance against that risk (assuming ex post insolvency was 
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foreseen ex ante). For a solvent firm, the put option will be worth its full 
potential value. Similarly, depending on how the firm’s sponsor or founder 
sets up the capital structure, the put option will vary in value. If assets are 
withdrawn from the firm, for example, the value of the put option declines, in 
addition to any decline in the value of the equity. We might expect, then, that 
depending upon what type of risk-sharing is most efficient, or, more 
particularly, what type of risk-sharing maximizes the entrepreneur’s or 
sponsor’s self-interest, we would see a range of different capital structures 
cropping up. These possibilities are discussed in detail in Parts III and IV 
below.  
 
III.  Underperformance, Embedded Puts, and the IPO Decision 
 
This section analyzes how, exactly, the imposition of the Section 11 
embedded put right affects the entrepreneur’s incentives. In Part III.A, I 
present a simple model of the entrepreneur’s decision to take his firm public 
through the IPO process, and then, in Part III.B, I show how the addition of 
an embedded put right destroys value and affects his decisionmaking. I then 
show, in Part III.C, how uncertainty regarding whether the put right will be 
exercisable can lead to initial underpricing at the time of the IPO, and still 
result in long term underperformance. The model I describe presents a 
simple method of estimating the value of the put option and the amount of 
value that it can potentially destroy based on known parameters, which I do 
in Part III.D; I also consider whether the observed magnitude and timing of 
long term underperformance is consistent with the model. 
 
A. The Decision of How to Fund a Project 
 
Suppose we have an entrepreneur who has a project that has a positive 
expected value (i.e., the project is expected, on average, to make money). The 
project, in the good state of the world, will perform very well and will make a 
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lot of money (denoted as G), or, in the bad state of the world, the project 
performs poorly, and will make little or no money (B < G). The project costs C 
to undertake, which the entrepreneur can fund with his own wealth or by 
recourse borrowing from a bank.33 Since in either case the entrepreneur must 
bear the cost of the project no matter what the outcome, the two possible 
payoffs are (G – C), which occurs with probability g, and (B – C), which occurs 
with probability (1 – g). The total expected value of the project is 
then ( ) CBggG −−+ 1 . To take a simple numerical example, if the probabilities 
of both the good and the bad states of the world are 50%, the good state cash 
flow from the project is 18, the bad state cash flow is $2, and the cost of the 
project is $2, then the expected value of the project is .5($18) + .5($2) – $2 = 
$8. 
If the entrepreneur is risk averse, his utility from holding on to the 
project will be less than his utility from receiving the expected value of the 
project up front, since the project’s payoffs are uncertain.34 For example, 
suppose the entrepreneur’s utility function is given as the square root of his 
wealth.35 Then the expected utility from the project is 2225.2185. =−+− . 
This is less than the utility of 2.83 that the entrepreneur would enjoy from 
receiving the expected value of the project up front.36  
Rather than wait to see how the project turns out, the entrepreneur 
may desire to sell part or all of the project to a shareholder. Why would the 
entrepreneur wish to do this? The principal reason is that the project is more 
valuable in the hands of the shareholder, who can diversify her assets by 
                                                     
33 At this point in the analysis, I am assuming that the entrepreneur will be solvent even in 
the bad state of the world. If insolvency is a risk, then the cost of borrowing is higher.  
34 The entrepreneur is likely to be risk averse with respect to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk 
because of wealth constraints—i.e., the amount of his wealth that is tied up in the firm is 
probably great enough that he is unable to diversify away the firm-specific risk. See Ritter 
and Welch (2002) at 1798 (“Pre-IPO ‘angel’ investors or venture capitalists hold undiversified 
portfolios, and, therefore, are not willing to pay as high a price as diversified public-market 
investors”). See Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999); Amit, Glosten, and Miller (1990). Hughes 
(1986), at 121, makes a similar assumption regarding risk aversion.  
35 The entrepreneur’s expected utility would be written as ( ) CBgCGg −−+− 1 . 
36 This is because the entrepreneur gets $8 in either state of the world, and 83.285.85. =+ . 
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holding shares of many such projects, than in the hands of the entrepreneur, 
who cannot.37 So, in this example, the entrepreneur would sell the 
shareholder a share or shares of stock representing some portion of the equity 
of the firm, in return for the cost of the project C.38 How would the 
shareholder price the equity—that is, the right to receive the cash flows from 
this project? The shareholder (who is risk neutral with regard to idiosyncratic 
risk)39 would be willing to pay up to the point where her expected return from 
the venture equals her investment. More formally, the shareholder will be 
willing to contribute the project funding cost C when the expected value of 
the share of the firm k that she receives is great enough that 
( )[ ] 01 ≥−−+ CBggGk  In the above numerical example, the shareholder, in 
return for contributing the cost C = $2 to the firm, would receive one-fifth of 
the firm (k = .2), while the entrepreneur would retain the other four-fifths.40 
                                                     
37 Some scholars have pointed to the desire for risk-diversification as being the primary 
impetus for the creation of the corporate form. [cite] 
38 Why wouldn’t the entrepreneur sell the entire project? One reason is that since the 
entrepreneur will have to pay the shareholders a market rate of return on their equity 
investment, it is likely that the entrepreneur would be unable to raise more than C dollars 
since the entrepreneur would have no useful employment for the excess cash. For example, 
suppose there are five identical but uncorrelated projects belonging to entrepreneurs E1 
through E5, where each project costs $2 to run and has a positive NPV; assuming that we 
have a shareholder with exactly $10—just enough to fund each of the projects—the 
shareholder would maximize the value of her capital by funding each of the projects and 
receiving some positive rent from each of the entrepreneurs.  
 An additional consideration is that shareholders may desire that the entrepreneur retain a 
significant stake in the firm as a way to mitigate agency costs, especially if the 
entrepreneur’s skills are required to make the project work correctly. This is more likely to 
be the case in firms that rely heavily upon the skills and experience of their founders, or 
firms that rely heavily on human capital and require large stock grants to insiders to 
incentive and retain them. I discuss the problem of “cashing out” in Part IV.D. 
 In fact, the data suggests that the entrepreneur generally will retain a sizeable stake: of IPO 
firms who are subsequently sued, firm insiders (directors and officers of the firm) own 49.2% 
of the firm after the offering. See Bohn and Choi (1996) at 961. 
39 I am assuming that systemic risk (or beta) is already priced in to these examples. Since 
beta risk should be borne equally well by either the entrepreneur or the shareholder, the 
explicit addition of systemic risk would not change the analysis. Note, however, that having 
the entrepreneur bear systemic risk may be harmful: some of the hedging strategies 
discussed in Part IV (such as managerial entrenchment) would be useful for hedging 
systemic risk as well. 
40 With the shareholder’s capital contribution of $2, the expected value of the firm is now $10, 
which is the expected value $8 of the project plus the $2 capital contribution. So the share of 
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The expected absolute payoff to the entrepreneur in this situation is the same 
as before (the entrepreneur sells the share for its net present value), but the 
entrepreneur’s utility in this situation is higher since the level of risk that 
the entrepreneur is exposed to is lower. Numerically, the entrepreneur’s 
objective payoff is g(1 – k)G + (1 – g)(1 – k)B = .5*.8*18 + .5*.8*2 = $8, which 
is the same as before. However, with the same risk averse utility function as 
above, we can see that the entrepreneur’s utility is higher, since 
53.228.5.188.5. =×+× , as opposed to utility of 2 that the entrepreneur 
would receive from funding the project himself or taking out recourse 
borrowing.  
 
From the above analysis, we can see that total welfare is maximized 
when the risk-averse entrepreneur can sell part of his project to the risk-
neutral shareholder. As a bearer of risk, the entrepreneur is quite inefficient, 
while the shareholder is very efficient. The entrepreneur can offload part or 
all of the idiosyncratic risk onto the shareholder, who can simply diversify it 
away with very little cost. 
 
B.  The Addition of an Embedded Put Right 
 
Now, suppose the law mandates that when the entrepreneur sells the 
shareholder the stock, the shareholder also gets the right to sell the stock 
back to the entrepreneur for the purchase price in the bad state of the world 
(a money-back guarantee or a put right). Such would be the case under 
Section 11 of the 1933 Act, where, in the bad state of the world, the 
shareholder may successfully sue for damages equal to the offering price of 
the security less the subsequent trading value. Suppose for the moment that 
the put right is certain to be exercisable in the bad state of the world. What 
are the payoffs to the entrepreneur and the shareholder in such a case?  
                                                                                                                                                             
the stock that the shareholder owns, should she trade it on the market, would be worth $2, 
since k*$10 = .2 * $10 = $2.  
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In the good state of the world, the shareholder will receive her share of 
the good-state cash flows (kG), while in the bad state of the world, the 
shareholder will sue the entrepreneur to recover the amount of her 
investment. In our numerical example, in the good state of the world the 
shareholder would receive a net payoff of (k*$18) – $2, while in the bad state 
the shareholder would receive a net payoff of $2 – $2 = $0, and so the 
minimum fraction of the project that the shareholder would demand in 
return for her investment of $2 is a one-ninth share of the firm.41 The 
entrepreneur’s payoff in this case is .5(8/9)18 + .5(0) = $8, and his expected 
utility is 2, which is identical to in the prior case where the entrepreneur 
funds the firm himself or through recourse borrowing.  
Note that the addition of this mandatory put option makes the risk 
averse entrepreneur worse off, but does not benefit the shareholder. The 
entrepreneur is unable to get rid of his risk: his payoffs and expected utility 
under the mandatory put regime are the same as if he had not sold the 
project to the shareholder in the first place. The important point here is that 
the mandatory put is, from the entrepreneur’s and shareholder’s point of 
view, functionally equivalent to a legal rule prohibiting the entrepreneur 
from selling the project to the shareholder.  
The shareholder is indifferent between the two scenarios. In the first 
case, without the put right, the shareholder pays $2 for an expected return of 
$2. In the second case, with the put right, the shareholder again pays $2 and 
again receives an expected return of $2. The variance (which is entirely 
idiosyncratic risk) in the first case is higher, but since the shareholder can 
hold a broad spectrum of assets in her portfolio, this firm-specific risk can be 
diversified away and is not relevant.  
The apparent market valuation of the firm in the second case is higher: 
the shareholder in the first case receives one-fifth of the firm for her 
                                                     
41 In the good state, then, the shareholder receives 1/9 * $18 – $2 = $0, and in the bad state, 
$2 - $2 = 0.  
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investment of $2, implying a total firm value of $10, while in the second case, 
the shareholder receives only one-ninth of the firm for the same investment, 
implying a total firm value of $18. The disparity between the two valuations, 
however, is not because the firm’s intrinsic expected value changes, since that 
stays at $10 in each case. Rather, the put option has a value that is reflected 
in the price the shareholder pays for her shares. For her investment of $2 in 
the firm with the put option, the shareholder receives a one-ninth equity 
share worth $1.11 (since the expected value of the firm’s cash flows is $10, of 
which she owns a ninth), while the embedded put option accounts for the 
other $.89 of value.  
 Since the option is not alienable from the equity interest, the 
value of the option will continue to affect the price at which the shares trade. 
At time zero, when the entrepreneur sells the shares to the shareholder, the 
shares will trade as if the expected value of the firm were $18, even though 
the expected value of the firm is only $10. At time 1, the good or bad state of 
the world is revealed, and at time 2 the shareholder will exercise her put 
option if it is in the money. There are two possible outcomes: (a) in the good 
state, the firm would realize cash flows of $18 and the shares would continue 
to trade reflecting the now-underlying value of $18, or (b) the bad state of the 
world is revealed, the shareholder exercises her put, withdrawing the 
remaining value of $2 from the firm, and the underlying equity interest is 
now worth zero. In the figure below, outcome (a) is denoted by the blue line, 
and outcome (b) is denoted by the red line. At time 0, the shares are sold to 
the shareholder; at time 1, the good or bad state of the world is revealed; and 
at time 2 the shareholder can exercise her put option. The green line, labeled 
“aggregate payoff” shows what a market index of identical (but uncorrelated) 
firms would look like: all firms would start out priced at $18, but at time 2, 
when shareholders of firms suffering a bad state exercise their put options, 
half the firms in the index have a value that drops to zero, while half the 
firms remain priced at $18, for an aggregate price of $9. For contrast, the 
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black dotted line shows what an index of such identical firms would look like 
if no embedded put option existed, meaning that firms are priced only based 
on expected future cash flows.  
 
 
 Two features of this graph are notable. First, with an embedded put 
option, the firm is initially priced in excess of expected value. This is due to 
the value of the put option, which is extinguished at time 2. Second, over 
time, aggregate price of such firms declines to a point below the ex ante 
expected value of the firm’s cash flows. This is because money is coming out 
of the firm. Putting the two effects together, IPO firms would appear to 
underperform non-IPO firms.  
 
C.  Price Movements with an Endogenous Put: Initial Underpricing, 
Long-Term Underperformance  
 
We might expect that the 1933 Act only imposes liability on the part of 
the issuing firm some percentage of the time, which we can denote as 
probability θ, where 10 ≤≤ θ . A θ of 1 means the put always will be enforced, 
and a θ of zero means the put will never be enforced; a value between 1 and 
zero means that there is only a likelihood of enforcement. As θ approaches 
zero, the expected value of the put also declines to zero, and the price a 
shareholder is willing to pay for the security declines to the expected value of 
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the firms’ project, which in the numerical example above would be $10.42 A 
lower θ makes the entrepreneur better off, though risk-averse shareholders 
are indifferent.43  
An exogenously determined θ has no effect on the entrepreneur’s 
pricing decision: as where θ equals zero or one, the entrepreneur will simply 
charge the highest price that shareholders will pay for the shares.44 The more 
interesting case, however, is where θ varies with the price. Suppose that θ is 
a positive function of the initial offering price. That is, as the price at which 
the entrepreneur sells the securities increases, so does the probability of 
being found liable (θ) if the bad state of the world occurs. In such a situation, 
there may be times when the entrepreneur chooses to offer the securities at a 
lower price than the market would bear—meaning that the market would 
immediately bid up the price of the shares once trading begins.  
Why would the probability of being found liable increase as the offering 
price increases? There are several possible reasons. First, significant 
underpricing may be a payoff to initial allocatees not to sue. Initial allocatees 
are largely institutional investors, who are repeat players in the IPO game, 
and who can be shut out of future offerings by the underwriter if they do not 
“play along.” Alternatively, and even more effectively, we might suppose that 
the initial allocatees remit a portion of the underpricing back to the issuing 
firm which lowers the offering price without reducing the proceeds to the 
issuer; this may take the form of tie-ins or other future business, or else be 
                                                     
42 This is after the shareholder’s $2 capital contribution to fund the project.  
43 Assuming that the firm will be solvent to pay the put (i.e., B ≥ C), the shareholder’s payoff 
function is ( ) ( )[ ] CkBCggkG −−+−+ θθ 11 . In the bad state of the world, with probability θ, she 
can exercise the put and receive back her purchase price C, while with probability (1- θ) she 
will only receive her share of the bad state profits, kB. The entrepreneur’s absolute payoff 
function is given as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]BkgGkg −−+−+− 11C-B11 θθ . The entrepreneur’s utility function 
(following the example given above) is the probability-weighted square roots of the ultimate 
state payoffs, or ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )BkgCBgGkg −−−+−−+− 11111 θθ . Insolvency makes the put less 
valuable; at the extreme, with complete insolvency (i.e., B = 0), the put has zero value.  
44 The reason for this is that lowering the price charged only serves to reduce the 
entrepreneur’s payoff in the good state of the world, without raising the entrepreneur’s 
payoff in the bad state.  
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intermediated through the underwriter, who is a repeat player, in the form of 
lowered underwriting fees or enhanced services.45 Second, as proposed in 
Hughes and Thakor (1992), underwriters who develop reputations for 
consistently underpricing have a higher Bayesian prior of having priced 
correctly.46 Other litigation-related models of underpricing have also been put 
forward;47 a complete exposition and analysis of these is, however, beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
Returning to our numerical example, suppose θ equals 1 whenever the 
entrepreneur offers the share at any price representing a firm value above 
$9, and is equal to 0.1 whenever the entrepreneur sells at a price less than or 
equal to $9.48 In this situation, the entrepreneur would choose to sell at $9 (P 
= C/k = $2/(2/9) = $9), since this yields an expected utility of 2.43, as opposed 
to expected of utility of 2 if he were to sell at the maximum price the market 
                                                     
45 The bribe method of avoiding liability is subject to some leakage, since initial allocatees 
generally do not hold on to all their allocations, and subsequent purchasers may also sue, 
and can utilize the class action mechanism. Institutions, however, do generally end up 
holding a large amount of the allocations, and have traditionally gotten a disproportionately 
large share of the awards or settlement from such litigation. The PSLRA, which strengthens 
the position of institutional investors by making them more likely to be the representative or 
lead plaintiff, could, under these theories of litigation avoidance, in fact increase the degree 
of initial underpricing, since placing underpriced securities with institutions as a bribe not to 
sue would become more cost-effective. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
 Having the initial allocatees simply hand back the amount of the underpricing to the issuer 
would, on the other hand, not be subject to such leakage, since this lowers the maximum 
potential damages without reducing proceeds to the issuer.  
46 Some scholarship suggests that underwriter reputation is not particularly useful for 
ensuring a fair price, and this theory of underpricing also largely neglects the role that the 
issuing firm’s disclosure plays in determining price. Bohn and Choi (1996) find that 
underwriter reputation, as proxied by lead and co-lead positions, has an inverse correlation 
with subsequent liability—exactly the opposite relationship suggested by Hughes and 
Thakor’s undewriter-driven model. Also, the same measurement problems that make it 
difficult to measure long run relative performance (as described in Ritter and Welch (2003)) 
also make it difficult to discern an underwriter’s reputation for fair pricing. See Spindler 
(2005), making a similar point.  
47 See, e.g., Tinic (1988), Hensler (1995). But c.f. Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) and Alexander 
(1996), arguing against litigation avoidance theories of underpricing.  
48 This function, though discontinuous, could represent the “going rate” payoff to institutional 
investors not to sue. The point to be made here is simply that at least some liability functions 
will result in rational initial underpricing and long term underperformance. 
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would bear, which is k = 1/9 or $18.49 So the initial price of the offering is 9, 
but the trading price would immediately rise to $10.35, since at this price the 
expected return to the shareholder from the share would equal the cost.50 
(One could conceptualize the initial underpricing of $1.35 as being the going-
rate for a bribe of initial allocatees not to sue.) This would look like a first day 
price spike, a common occurrence in IPOs.51 The spike is the difference 
between the offering price, set to avoid liability, and the expected value of the 
firm’s cash flows ($10) plus the value of the embedded option component 
($0.35).52  
Later on, if the good state of the world occurs, the price of the share 
would rise to 18. If the bad state of the world occurs, the shareholder can 
exercise her put option with probability θ = .1. If she is able to enforce her 
put, the price of the underlying equity declines to zero (she takes the 
remaining money out of the firm, and the equity becomes worthless), and if 
                                                     
49 Why would the entrepreneur, if he is going to sell above $9, sell at $18? The reason is that 
because θ does not increase as the entrepreneur raises the offering price of the firm above 
$9.01, his expected bad state payoff does not worsen, either. Realizing this, the entrepreneur 
would then seek to maximize his good state payoff by raising the firm price as high as 
possible, with the limit being set by what shareholders are willing to pay. Since the 
shareholder’s payoff function is ( ) ( )[ ] CkBCggkG −−+−+ θθ 11 , plugging in the numbers, we 
find that k = 1/9. Since the offering price of the firm, P, is equal to C/k, the offering price of 
the firm here will be $18. The entrepreneur’s utility pursuing this strategy is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )BkgCBgGkg −−−+−−+− 11111 θθ , or ( ) ( ) 22$2$5.18$9115. =−+− . 
 Similarly, we can figure what price the entrepreneur would sell for, given that he is going to 
sell for not more than $9. Because θ is constant between $0 and $9, increasing the price all 
the way to $9 increases the entrepreneur’s upside without worsening the downside; so we can 
conclude he will sell at $9, which means that k = 2/9. At a price of $9, shareholders would pay 
$2 to receive 2/9 of the firm. The entrepreneur’s utility here will be 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )29/219.5.2$2$)1(.5.18$9/215. −+−+− , or 2.43. 
50 The shareholder payoff from holding the share of the firm is ( ) ( )[ ])2)($9/2(9.)2)($1(.5.)18)($9/2)(5(. ++ , or $2.3, meaning that the market would bid the price 
up to $10.35 ($2.3 / (2/9) = $10.35).  
51 Ritter and Welch (2002) at 1802 estimate that IPOs are underpriced about 18.8% on 
average.  
52 It is not necessarily always going to be the case the IPO is underpriced relative to the 
value of the firm’s cash flows. For example, if the function θ is 1 whenever pricing is above 
$11, but .1 whenever pricing is below $11, the entrepreneur would price the shares at $11, 
which is above the expected value of the firm’s cash flows. There would still be a spike in the 
price, however, since the value of the option has not been completely priced in. So we would 
still see the same patterns of apparent short-term underpricing and long term overpricing.  
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not, the price of the security declines to 2. In the aggregate, the price of an 
index of identical firms would come to rest at 9.9, which is below the ex ante 
expected value of the firm. The following graph illustrates these price 
movements. 
 
 
 
Note that the aggregate price pattern line of this graph resembles the 
observed phenomena of short term underpricing and long term 
underperformance. What this analysis shows is that initial underpricing is 
compatible with long-term overpricing, and that both phenomena may occur 
as a result of Securities Act liability. “Underperformance”—meaning an 
initial trading price that is in excess of the expected value of the firm’s future 
cash flows—is here a result not of deceptive practices on the part of the 
issuing firm or underwriter, but rather a consequence of a built-in statutory 
liability that refunds a shareholder’s investment in the bad state of the 
world.  
Is initial underpricing necessarily a bad thing? After all, while issuing 
firms do not receive as high a price for their shares, initial purchasers of 
securities gain. However, the result of systemic underpricing is to make it 
t=0 t=1 t=2
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more expensive for firms to raise equity, and particularly among those firms 
that have a higher degree of risk.  
 
D.  Can This Theory of Embedded Options Explain Observed 
Patterns of Long-Term Underperformance?53  
 
In this section, I present a way to value the expected magnitude of 
“IPO underperformance” due to liability effects, utilizing existing data on the 
rate of suit and settlement. IPO underperformance is the phenomenon 
whereby IPO stocks appear to underperform the market in the long-run (say, 
five years), measured from the close of the first day of trading.54 This appears 
to make them a systematically bad deal for those investors who are not lucky 
enough to get in on the initial allocations of the IPO shares.55 Indeed, this 
trend has led some commentators to question whether the capital markets 
really are efficient, or whether some form of fraud, bounded rationality, or 
fundamental shortcoming of the IPO process is at play.56 I would posit, in 
contrast, that regulatory distortion can explain at least some of this 
underperformance: the 1933 Act’s embedded put option causes securities to 
be sold in excess of the value of their discounted cash flows, and in the bad 
                                                     
53 I would stress that, even if the magnitude of the liability put is not particularly large 
relative to the share price, this does not affect the results in the other portions of the paper. 
Even if the entrepreneur’s stake in the firm is small relative to total firm value, his stake is 
probably still significant to him and will affect his behavior as described in Part IV.  
54 See Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, at 419 (“There is… at least one 
puzzle left. [I]t appears that the long-run performance of companies that issue shares is 
substandard. Investors who bought these companies’ shares after the stock issue earned 
lower returns than they would have if they had bought into similar companies…. If so, we 
have an exception to the efficient-market theory.”); Ritter and Welch (2002) at 1816-22. The 
underpricing trend was first noted by Ritter (1991). Ritter and Welch (2002) provide an 
excellent overview of theories and research on long term IPO underperformance as well as 
short term underpricing.  
55 The initial allocations are, on average, underpriced by about 18.8%, compared to the first 
day’s close, meaning that the issuer theoretically could have received a significantly greater 
amount of proceeds than it did. See Ritter and Welch at 1802 (examining a sample of IPOs 
from 1980 to 2001). This, of course, is a good deal for investors, but initial allocations are 
doled out principally to institutional investors and favored clients. The overall pattern of IPO 
pricing is an immediate first day spike, followed by a multi-year period of underperformance 
relative to the non-IPO market (i.e., firms whose IPO was more than five years prior). 
56 See Soderquist and Shayne (1995); Ritter and Welch (2002).  
 Page 29 
state of the world, the value of the securities is depressed as the option 
component’s value is extinguished and money comes out of the firm to pay off 
the put right.57  
Why would IPO firms fare differently under the Securities Act than 
non-IPO firms (i.e., firms who are more than five years out from their IPO)? 
Most obviously, IPO firms have, by definition, just done a public offering, 
making them subject to Securities Act liability; non-IPO firms may not have. 
Non-IPO firms, even if they have recently done an offering, will also have 
shares outstanding that are not subject to Section 11 liability. Additionally, 
non-IPO firms have numerous disclosure options that are subject only to 
fraud liability, such as annual reports, press releases, and conference calls,58 
whereas all of the IPO issuer’s disclosure is subject to strict liability, with 
IPO disclosure requirements being generally much more extensive than that 
required of non-IPO firms. With this in mind, we can make a few specific 
predictions about how IPO firms will appear to perform compared to non-IPO 
firms.  
 
1.  Timing 
 
First off, we can make some predictions from the model about when 
the bulk of the underperformance ought to occur. While price decay of the 
option component should continue over time, we would expect price decay to 
accelerate as expiration nears. The expiration of the option may be at one of 
two general times: one year from the date of discovery of the misstatement or 
omission, or three years after the date of the offering, as a final outer limit. 
The first potential expiration date can be no earlier than one year after the 
offering, but thereafter the plaintiff runs some risk of being barred; so, when 
a firm has performed poorly, we would expect a cluster of suits just before one 
                                                     
57 Alexander (1991, 1994) and Hughes and Thakor (1992) make a similar point. 
58 Non-IPO issuers also have the benefit of the PSLRA safe harbor for forward looking 
statements, which employs a fraud standard, as opposed to Rule 175’s “reasonable” and “good 
faith”—often interpreted to mean “likelihood” (see n.23 supra)—requirement.  
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year after the date of the offering, since plaintiffs want to make sure that 
their claims are not barred by the statute. From this, we would expect to see 
the greatest amount of underperformance just before the one and three year 
marks.  
Data from Ritter (2003)59 appear to comport with these timing 
predictions: in a sample of 7,850 IPO firms and non-IPO firms taken from 
1970 to 2002, Ritter finds that IPO firms tend to underperform in the first 
year post-issuance (for size matched firms, underperformance was 3.6%, 
whereas for size and book-to-market ratio matched firms, underperformance 
was 0.5%), with poorer returns concentrated in the second half of the year 
(for size matched, IPO firms actually outperformed in the first six months by 
1.7%, but then underperformed in the second six months by 5.3%; for size and 
book-to-market matched firms, IPO firms outperformed by 4.3% in the first 
six months, only to underperform by 4.2% in the second six months). This 
pattern of greater underperformance in the second half of the first year exists 
when looking at individual decades of the 70s, 80s and 90s, as well. Even in 
the 80s, when IPO firms appear not to have experienced significant 
underperformance,60 IPO firms still exhibit the pattern of doing relatively 
worse in the second half of the first year.61  
There is, similarly, an greater degree of underperformance in the 
second and third years as compared to the fourth and fifth years. IPO 
underperformance (against size-matched firms) accelerates from 3.6% in year 
one to 8.8% in year two and 5.1% in year 3, before tapering off in years four 
                                                     
59 See Jay Ritter, Long-run returns on IPOs from 1970 to 2002, available at 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOS5.PDF 
60 Against size-matched firms, IPO firms underperformed by 2.8% in the 80s, while against 
size and book-to-market matched firms, IPO firms actually outperformed by 0.4%.  
61 Against size matched firms, IPO’s outperformed by 1% in the first six months, and 
underperformed by 2.8% in the second six months. Against size and book-to-market matched 
firms, IPO firms outperformed by 4.9% in the first six months, but then underperformed by 
0.5% in the second six months.  
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and five (where underperformance is 2.6% and 0.8%, respectively).62 This is, 
again, consistent with the statute of limitations: three years after the date of 
an offering is the cut-off for any action under Section 11, after which claims 
cannot be filed. Roughly speaking, at least, the timing of IPO 
underperformance appears consistent with an embedded put model, where 
option expirations are concentrated at one and three years after the 
offering.63 
 
2.  Magnitude 
 
While some previous work has suggested that the incidence of 
securities suits may not be great enough to contribute significantly to IPO 
underperformance,64 more recent and more detailed evidence on rates of suit 
and magnitude of settlement suggests just the opposite. For example, 
according to a study by James Bohn and Stephen Choi, for the top decile of 
firms by offering size, the incidence of lawsuit is 12.20%.65 The top 20% of 
issuers account for just under half of all IPO suits in Bohn and Choi’s sample 
(with a suit incidence of 9.1%), and, since the top 20% by size of IPO issuers 
account for at least (and almost certainly more) than 47% of IPO volume, 
dollar-weighted figures for incidence of IPO suit would likely be higher.66 
                                                     
62 For size and book-to-market matched firms, IPO underperformance is 0.5% in year one, 
4.1% in year two, 3.1% in year three, 3.4% in year four, and 1.1% in year five.  
63 The timing of underperformance also appears to accord roughly with the length of time 
after the IPO that plaintiffs file suit, as reported by Bohn and Choi (1996) at 929 (of 103 IPO 
suits, 11 were filed in the first six months after the offering, 28 were filed between six 
months and one year after the offering, 35 were filed in the second year, 30 were filed in the 
third year, and nine were filed more than three years after the IPO). This, again, looks like 
the sort of clustering we would expect to see with options having an uncertain one or three 
year expiration.  
64 The only previous attempt to estimate the magnitude of this effect is that of Alexander 
(1994), See Alexander at 1447. Alexander relied on unpublished data and the Drake and 
Vetsuypens study, infra, that looked at the average rate of suit incidence during only a small 
time period. More recent data, discussed infra, suggests that rates of suit overall may be 
higher, and that rates of suit are significantly higher for larger or higher-variance issuers.   
65 James Bohn and Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New Issues Market, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev 905, 
936. This is in contrast to the overall incidence of suit of 3.5% for all IPO firms.  
66 From Bohn and Choi’s Table 2.5, by adding up the minimum bounds of the various firm-
size categories, one can surmise that the top 20% of offerings by size accounted for, at the 
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While these are fairly rough numbers, they suggest that the median IPO 
dollar gets sued at least 9.1% of the time, which may well have significant 
effects on securities price movements.  
Assuming a suit occurs, how much money can shareholders expect to 
get back? Drake and Vetsuypens, in a study of 93 IPOs dating from 1969 to 
1990, report that a firm whose shares decline below their offering price, 
conditional upon being sued, can expect to settle for 31.7% of the post offering 
decline, on average.67 After accounting for attorneys’ fees (which takes up 
approximately 21% of settlement amounts), shareholders receive about 25% 
of post offering declines.68 Taking that, along with Bohn and Choi’s number 
for incidence of suit for the largest 20% of offerings—9.1%—as a proxy for the 
likelihood of the bad state of the world occurring; and assuming a minimally-
solvent issuing firm in the bad state of the world,69 we would find that, in the 
aggregate, IPO securities would underperform otherwise identical IPO 
securities by about 2.3%.70 This is not so far off from the 5.1% 
underperformance that Ritter and Welch find for IPO firms in a style and 
size-matched sample.71  
Of course, had I used a smaller suit incidence rate, such as Bohn and 
Choi’s overall average of 3.5%, the degree of underperformance would have 
                                                                                                                                                             
very least (and probably significantly more), 47% of total offering volume. See Bohn and Choi 
(1996) at 936.  
67 See Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) 
68 See O’Brien (1991) 
69 That is, C = B.  
70 With an average settlement/losses ratio of S, the specification here is that the shareholder 
will invest where ( ) ( )[ ] .011 ≥−−+−+ CkBSSCggkG  In the bad state of the world, the 
shareholder has probability S of recovering her investment C, while with probability 1-S she 
will receive only her share of the firm, kB. Solving for k, we find that the shareholder would 
demand, in return for her investment of C, a share of the firm k at least as great as 
BSggG
SCgCk
)1)(1(
)1(
−−+
−−= . 
 The imputed price of the firm at the time of the IPO is equal to C/k, while the expected value 
of the firm after the good or bad state of the world is revealed and after the put may be 
determined exercisable is ( )( )BSCBSggG )1()(1 −+−−+ . Relative underperformance, as a 
percentage, compared to identical non-IPO firms is ( )( )
k
C
BSCBSggGk
C )1()(1 −+−−−− . 
71 See Ritter and Welch (2002), at 1817.  
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been smaller—only about 0.9%—but this is still a notable effect. On the other 
hand, utilizing a higher incidence of suit, such as the 12.2% that the largest 
decile of offerings face, the degree of underperformance grows larger, to 3.1%. 
Going still higher, by taking O’Brien and Hodge’s finding that 1 in 4 
computer and electronics manufacturers is sued, we would expect relative 
underperformance of 6.3%. As the probability of a bad state of the world gets 
higher, as proxied by the incidence of suit, so does the degree of 
underperformance.  
Where the firm is more than minimally-solvent (B > C) in the bad 
state, underperformance is positively correlated to the spread between the 
payoffs in the good and bad states of the world. For instance, if a firm had 
good and bad payoffs of 6 and 3, with C = 2,the degree of underperformance of 
a firm that has a 9.1% chance of reaching the bad state is 1.9%. Raising the 
good state payoff to 12 increases underperformance to 2.1%. Generalizing 
from this, firms with the highest degree of good/bad spread and the greatest 
probability of suffering a bad state payoff would tend to exhibit the most 
underperformance. This might be a good characterization of the sort of very 
speculative, boom-or-bust high-tech companies that dominated the IPO 
market in the late 1990s, and so we would expect to see the greatest degree of 
underperformance there. While data in this area are currently lacking, there 
is some rough empirical sugpport for this proposition: in going-public cohorts 
that have a high percentage of technology stocks, underperformance tends to 
be higher. For instance, in 1980 to 1989, where only 26% of firms going public 
were tech stocks, style-adjusted underperformance is not observable. In 
contrast, in 1999–2000, when 72% IPO firms were tech stocks (and highly 
speculative ones, at that), that cohort exhibited a very high degree of 
underperformance.72 
                                                     
72 See Ritter and Welch (2002) at 1797, 1800. It should be pointed out, however, that in the 
period from 1995-8, which the percentage of tech IPO firms rise from 23% in 1990-94 to 37% 
(admittedly a small increase when compared to 1999-2000), style-adjusted underperformance 
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 Table 1, below, presents varying parameters and the resultant degree 
of underperformance. 
 In any event, the point here is to illustrate that the existing data does 
support the possibility that embedded put liability plays a significant role in 
observed patterns of long-term underperformance. Furthermore, even if the 
degree of underperformance caused by the embedded option effect is 
relatively small, the effects upon the entrepreneur’s actions may still be very 
significant. Suppose that the entrepreneur sells off the majority of the firm to 
the shareholder, and retains a very small amount for himself. Even if the 
magnitude of his holding is not great enough to seriously impact the overall 
price of the publicly traded stock of the firm, the fact remains that his equity 
position may be wiped out by Section 11 liability, and this will likely affect 
his decision-making, both at the pre-IPO stage and thereafter in managing 
the company. This is the focus of the next Part of this paper.  
 
Table 1 
 
 Solvent Firm (B=C) Insolvent Firm (B<C) 
Probability of good 
state (g) 75.0% 87.8% 90.9% 96.5% 75.0% 87.8% 90.9% 96.5% 
Good state payoff 
(G) $6 $6 $6 $6 $6 $6 $6 $6 
Probability of bad 
state (1-g) 25.0% 12.2% 9.1% 3.5% 25.0% 12.2% 9.1% 3.5% 
Bad state payoff (B) $2 $2 $2 $2 $3 $3 $3 $3 
Ratio of settlement 
value to market 
losses (S) 
25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Cost of the 
project/shareholders' 
investment (C) 
$2 $2 $2 $2 $4 $4 $4 $4 
Underperformance 6.25% 3.05% 2.28% 0.88% 4.69% 2.29% 1.71% 0.66% 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
was not observable. This may be due to the fact that the data is, as Ritter and Welch point 
out, quite noisy, especially when adjusting for common risk factors. See id at 1820.  
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IV. Strategic Reactions to Embedded Put Liability 
 
 In the previous Part, I described one method that the entrepreneur can 
utilize to limit his risk exposure, short term underpricing of the offering. In 
this part, I will describe several more tactics that the entrepreneur may use, 
each of which has the potential to destroy value, but which are rational given 
the constraints of Section 11. 
 
A.  Risk Reduction: Information and Investment Choice 
 
The ostensible purpose of Section 11 is to encourage the entrepreneur 
to invest in reducing the risk of the project being sold to the shareholder, 
which Section 11 accomplishes by internalizing the firm’s risk upon the 
entrepreneur even post-sale. (Note that the standard account—that the 
purpose of Section 11 is to discourage fraud—is probably inaccurate.73) For 
example, an entrepreneur who believes he has developed a medical device 
with a high expected net present value, but with a great deal of uncertainty 
surrounding that expectation, might invest in further test trials of the device 
prior to starting mass production, which entails a very large investment. 
Some investigation to reduce uncertainty can add value, even if costly, since 
it provides an option to withhold investment if the project turns out to be a 
dud;74 requiring some degree of investigation prior to sale to the shareholder 
may be desirable if it is not feasible, due to agency costs, to undertake the 
investigation postsale.75 The entrepreneur may be reluctant to engage in such 
                                                     
73 See, e.g., Sale at 434 for a statement of the traditional view. To the contrary, Section 11 
almost certainly encourages “fraud”—that is, it encourages the entrepreneur to maximize 
proceeds received by selling the firm at a price in excess of the net present value of its cash 
flows. For instance, the firm described in Part III.B above does best under Section 11 by 
selling to the shareholder at the price at the very top of the range of possible outcomes—in 
that case, for a total firm valuation of $18. Other sections of the 1933 Act—such as Sections 
17 and 24—do discourage fraud, of course, and are in tension with Section 11.  
74 See Brealey and Myers (2003) at 268-78 for a discussion of real options.  
75 That is, an entrepreneur who extracts private benefits from running the firm might decide 
to invest the shareholder’s money in the project even if it turns out to be a dud, since the 
alternative—giving the money back to the shareholder—does not provide those private 
benefits.  
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investigations prior to sale, since the entrepreneur may prefer to receive the 
expected value of the firm, behind the veil of ignorance, rather than risk 
being stuck with a low-value project. Here Section 11’s strict liability can play 
a helpful role, since it shifts risk back onto the entrepreneur post-sale.76 
However, the entrepreneur has substitutes to investigation (or investment in 
disclosure accuracy) that can be quite destructive, and these substitutes are 
the focus of the rest of this Part.  
One such substitute is that the entrepreneur would shun high risk 
projects—even at the expense of higher net present value—because he will be 
ultimately unable to transfer the risk to shareholders. The entrepreneur in 
Part III.B above would trade in the project with payoffs of $18 and $2 for a 
project with payoffs of $14 and $4. The reason is the entrepreneur’s risk 
aversion: the increase in the bad state payoff from $2 to $4 is worth more to 
him than the decrease from $18 to $14 (total utility is 2.4 with the new 
project, as opposed to 2 with the original project), even though the expected 
value of the new project ($14/2 + $4/2 – $2 = $7) is less than the expected 
value of the original project ($18/2 + $2/2 – $2 = $8). As the extreme case, the 
entrepreneur would choose a sure thing of $6.01 over the original project 
(expected value of $6.01 – $2 = $4.01), with a societal loss in value of $3.99.77 
Obviously, this is not a useful tradeoff, since in this example the variance is 
purely idiosyncratic risk, which, once again, the shareholder could diversify. 
                                                     
76 More narrowly tailored alternatives to strict liability are discussed in Part V.  
77 I should point out that, even without the existence of the embedded §11 option, the 
entrepreneur would still have some incentive to choose lower variance projects since he may 
not be able to diversify completely due to his large ownership stake. However, this would be 
of a lesser degree than when §11 liability is in effect, and we can calculate what the 
difference in social welfare would be. With no §11 liability, where total utility of the original 
project is 2.53, the entrepreneur would require a sure thing of at least $6.40, which 
represents a loss of only $1.60 from the project’s expected value of $8. Comparing the break 
even sure-thing in the non-§11 scenario of $6.40 with the $4.01 break even in the §11 
scenario, we can see in our example that the imposition of §11 liability has the potential to 
destroy an extra $2.39 worth of value.  
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Thus, the investment in risk reduction may well come at the expense of 
actual value.78  
 
B.  Insurance and Hedging  
 
 We might suppose that the entrepreneur, recognizing his risk 
exposure, would want to hedge his risk by purchasing derivatives or liability 
insurance. This would reduce his exposure, and reduce the distortion in his 
behavior that Section 11 might otherwise cause. But does an insurance 
market exist that could insure firm outcomes? Given that the reason many 
firms go public is to diversify risk and to satisfy capital requirements that the 
private market cannot, it seems doubtful.  
While there is a ready counterparty for a hedging transaction in the 
form of the shareholders—the firm could simply purchase back the puts from 
them—this would likely fall afoul of the securities laws or SEC regulation, 
since it would amount to an agreement on the part of the shareholders not to 
sue the firm. Of course, as discussed in Part III.C, the firm could do the 
functional equivalent of buying back the puts from initial allocatees by 
bribing them not to sue with initial underpricing; this is, unfortunately, 
illegal.79  
 Alternatively, the firm could purchase insurance against liability. In 
practice, this done to a limited extent with directors’ and officers’ (D&O) 
insurance, although the coverage appears to be partial, at best.80 More 
general issuer’s liability insurance does not seem to exist. It would not be 
                                                     
78 From an ex post perspective, it is also possible that the entrepreneur would undertake 
higher risk, lower value projects where the firm has performed badly and the entrepreneur 
expects to be sued, in a situation analogous to the conflict between debt and equity where a 
firm faces insolvency.  
79 Among other things, this could be seen as a scheme or artifice to defraud under Section 17 
of the Securities Act. Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act specifically 
prohibit disclaimer or waiver of liability under the Acts. See Securities Act Section 13; 
Securities Exchange Act Section 29.  
80 Alexander reports that D&O insurance is partial in settlements (which are, of course, 
generally for smaller amounts than trial awards), with issuers paying 50 to 80 percent of 
settlement values themselves. See Alexander (1991), at 572.  
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that surprising if the insurance market lacks the capability to fully insure 
IPO firms, since this would be equivalent to selling all the firm’s downside to 
the insurer, and since one of the reasons for going public in the first place is 
that private buyers lack the capacity to buy all the firm’s shares.81 Finally, 
the SEC’s marked hostility to insurance and indemnification also limits such 
practices.82  
 
 C. Managerial Entrenchment 
 
If the entrepreneur faces the risk of having his shareholdings wiped 
out by the liability put in the event of subsequent declines in share price, and 
since share price declines increase the likelihood, ceteris paribus, that the 
entrepreneur would lose his job as manager of the firm, the entrepreneur 
faces the daunting possibility of finding himself not just poor, but also 
unemployed. One way of mitigating this outcome, then, is to implement 
entrenchment mechanisms that allow the entrepreneur to keep his job as 
manager even when the firm performs poorly. A range of options are open to 
the entrepreneur here. Arlen and Talley (2004) describe overt and covert 
forms of entrenchment and, interestingly, point out that managers generally 
employ overt entrenchment forms—done with shareholder knowledge and 
approval, often at or enabled at the IPO stage—rather than covert forms. 
This implies that shareholders and the entrepreneur see these entrenchment 
devices as joint-welfare maximizing; one possible explanation for why this 
would be so is the risk-shifting model developed in this paper; entrenchment 
may lead to an optimal outcome given that the Securities Act has relegated 
us to a second-best world.  
 Interestingly, a study by Daines and Klausner reports a positive 
correlation between the shareholdings of management and the use of anti-
takeover provisions. This is consistent with the hypothesis that as 
                                                     
81 That is, if the entrepreneur can find a private buyer for the firm’s downside, there may be 
little reason to access public markets in the first place.  
82 See, e.g., Items 510, 512, and 702 of Regulation S-K.  
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entrepreneurs are less able to cash out of the firm, meaning that they are 
increasingly exposed to idiosyncratic risk, they would increasingly invest in 
anti-takeover technologies to hedge that risk. 
 
D.  Removal of Assets from the Firm 
  
 The entrepreneur can attempt to remove assets from the firm or 
liquidate his stake in the firm. This has the effect of by-passing the Section 
11 put: if the entrepreneur can take money out of the firm such that the firm 
is unable to pay the put when the shareholder attempts to exercise it, then 
the put may as well not exist.83  
 There are two principal ways in which the entrepreneur can go about 
removing his capital. First, the entrepreneur could retain sole ownership of 
firm assets, and lease those assets to the firm to undertake the project. In our 
numerical example, supposing that these assets have a value of $2 in either 
state of the world, the project’s payoffs go from being $18/$2 in the good/bad 
state to $16/$0 once the assets are removed. The Section 11 put is now 
valueless. The shareholder, realizing this, will demand a greater percentage 
of the firm for her investment of $2 (i.e., the price paid for the shares is 
lower), but at the end of the day the shareholder is no worse off.  
One problem with this approach, however, in that there may be value 
in the firm’s owning the assets. For instance, if the possibility exists that the 
entrepreneur would be tempted to act opportunistically and withdraw the use 
of the asset from the firm in the event that a better opportunity comes along, 
the shareholders may be less willing to invest in the firm. Another example is 
that the entrepreneur’s retention of vital assets allows the entrepreneur to 
                                                     
83 One limitation on this approach is that Section 11 extends liability to the firm’s 
management, and Section 15 extends liability to control persons. This liability is, however, 
subject to a due diligence defense, and the entrepreneur would be able to escape direct 
liability by meeting what is essentially a negligence standard. See Section 11(b) of the 
Securities Act.  
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entrench himself in the management of the firm.84 In short, the 
entrepreneur’s retention of assets imposes an additional agency cost that may 
reduce overall value.  
 A second possibility is that the entrepreneur could seek to cash out of 
the firm entirely. He could do this by selling all of his stock to the 
shareholder, thus eliminating his exposure to idiosyncratic risk and allowing 
diversification into other projects. In such a case, the Section 11 put right is 
valueless, since the shareholder will own the entire firm herself and there 
would be no residual stakeholder to put the firm back to.85 Alternatively, the 
entrepreneur may have the firm borrow from a bank, using the shareholder’s 
equity as collateral, in order to cash out the entrepreneur. For example, the 
entrepreneur in the $18/$2 scenario could have the firm borrow $2 from the 
bank which the firm pays to the entrepreneur (this could be styled as a buy-
back of some of the entrepreneur’s equity or as a purchase of assets that the 
entrepreneur has retained ownership of). This reduces payoffs to $16/$0, 
erasing the value of the put, which means that the shareholder would ex ante 
pay a lower price for the firm’s shares. Once again, this does not necessarily 
make the shareholder worse off since the price has adjusted accordingly.86 
However, more debt increases the likelihood of insolvency and, hence, also 
the expected costs of financial distress.87  
A more fundamental problem is that where the entrepreneur is going 
to stay on to manage the firm, a high ownership stake on his part would help 
to properly align his interests with those of the shareholder. The imposition 
                                                     
84 See Arlen and Talley (2003) for a description of how firm founders can entrench 
themselves in management by retaining ownership of important assets. For example, Donna 
Karan’s retention of the DKNY brand name allows her to defeat any prospective takeover 
offers.  
85 As above, the shareholder can still sue the entrepreneur under Section 11, but this suit is 
subject to the entrepreneur’s due diligence defense. 
86 This does require, of course, that the shareholder realizes that the entrepreneur is going to 
do this ahead of time.  
87 See Brealey and Myers (2003) at 497-510. The risk of insolvency increases the cost of 
borrowing because of the costliness of bankruptcies and the unwillingness of creditors, 
workers, and other third parties to do business with a firm that is likely to become insolvent 
in the future.  
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of the Section 11 put option makes the entrepreneur want to reduce his 
stakeholding in the firm more than he otherwise would, exacerbating agency 
costs. 
 
E.  Reduced Information 
  
It is customary in securities law practice to think of risk factor 
disclosure as limiting the seller’s liability by providing an insurance policy of 
sorts; the court-created “bespeaks caution” doctrine allows the issuer to 
escape liability by describing risks that may subsequently materialize. On 
the other side of the same coin, disclosure of positive information can be quite 
risky: positive disclosure increases the probability that the firm will make 
what, in hindsight at least, appears to be a material misstatement or 
omission. So firms may wish to disclose less positive information, and more 
negative information. 
There is, of course, a cost to this strategy: by reducing positive 
disclosure and increasing negative disclosure, the issuing firm suffers an 
asymmetric information problem where investors are unable to determine 
whether the firm is of good or bad quality. It is not clear whether, and in 
what circumstances, the advantages of reduced liability from nondisclosure 
can outweigh the costs of adverse selection and the consequent higher cost of 
capital. 
One unambiguous alternative, however, is that the firm can invest in 
disclosure “arbitrage,” substituting a low liability form of disclosure for a high 
liability form. Spindler (2005) presents such a model of this, where the issuer 
signals information to the market through the underwriter’s research 
analyst, effectively substituting fraud liability for strict liability.88 Other 
possibilities may include, though they are not without significant problems or 
                                                     
88 See Spindler (2005).  
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costs, a pre-emptive offering,89 investment in high reputation underwriters,90 
or covertly leaking additional information to the market.91  
 
F.  Firm-Level Diversification and “Empire-Building” 
 
Finally, given that the entrepreneur is going to be subject to an 
increased level of idiosyncratic risk under Section 11 liability, we would 
expect the entrepreneur (assuming he retains management of the firm) to 
engage in an increased degree of firm level diversification, or “empire-
building.” Because the entrepreneur’s wealth is tied up in the idiosyncratic 
fortunes of his firm, the entrepreneur may seek to have the firm diversify by 
buying other firms or expanding into different lines of business, providing a 
natural hedge against bad state outcomes. 
This activity is not necessarily destructive of value (after all, combined 
firms sometimes yield synergies or economies of scale), but it seems 
inadvisable compared to allowing diversification at the shareholder level. 
First, purchases of other firms entail significant transaction costs, which the 
shareholder could accomplish more cheaply by simply buying the other firms’ 
traded stock. Second, if diseconomies or anti-synergies exist between the 
acquiring and acquired firms such that the merger is value-destroying, the 
entrepreneur may proceed regardless, because his gain from diversification 
outweighs his share of the resultant loss. Third, diversification at the firm 
                                                     
89 This entails going public in a small offering so as to become a public reporting company, 
and then doing a larger offering once the market has acquired more information. 
90 As discussed supra at n. __, underwriter reputation is of dubious efficacy in 
pricing/liability matters. 
91 For example, the issuing firm could tell the initial allocatees such information at the road 
show. This is technically subject to strict liability under Section 12, though this may be 
weakened by evidentiary difficulties in proving a case based on roadshow disclosure and by 
the fact that roadshow attendees are repeat players and thus subject to future sanctions 
(e.g., exclusion from future allocations) if they sue. The issuer and the investors may be able 
to approximate the “right” level of disclosure liability in this way. One problem with this 
approach, however, is that these communications are not observable to investors in the 
market at large (i.e., those investors not present at the roadshow), who would have no 
remedy based upon this disclosure, and who would therefore not rely upon it in making an 
investment decision. See Spindler (2005). 
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level reduces the ability of the individual investor to tailor her portfolio as 
best suits her: while she may wish to own firm A and not firm B, she may 
have no choice in the matter if firm A acquires firm B (assuming appropriate 
derivative instruments do not exist92).  
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 This paper has shown that the Securities Act’s standard of strict 
liability for IPO disclosure has the effect of inefficiently allocating 
diversifiable risk to the entrepreneur, resulting in a distortion of the 
entrepreneur’s behavior. Such distortions include generally value-destroying 
activities, such as entrenchment, initial underpricing, empire-building, end-
runs around disclosure rules, lower-value project choice, and asset removal or 
partitioning. At the same time, this paper demonstrates that the Securities 
Act may play a significant role in the perceived long-term underperformance 
of IPO firms, by embedding a put option whose value declines over time. 
While such a disclosure liability regime may lead the entrepreneur to invest 
more in accurate disclosure, this potential benefit is uncertain as the 
entrepreneur has substitute responses at his disposal—the above value-
destroying behaviors—that may minimize his liability more efficiently.  
                                                     
92 See Easterbrook (2002) 
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